Is there an election cycle in public employment? Separating time effects from election year effects by Dahlberg, Matz & Mörk, Eva
 IS THERE AN ELECTION CYCLE IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT? SEPARATING TIME 
EFFECTS FROM ELECTION YEAR EFFECTS  
Matz Dahlberg, Eva Mörk  
Document de treball de l’IEB 2011/8 
 
 
 
 
Documents de Treball de l’IEB 2011/8 
IS THERE AN ELECTION CYCLE IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT?  
SEPARATING TIME EFFECTS FROM ELECTION YEAR EFFECTS 
 
 
Matz Dahlberg, Eva Mörk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The IEB research program in Fiscal Federalism aims at promoting research in the public 
finance issues that arise in decentralized countries. Special emphasis is put on applied 
research and on work that tries to shed light on policy-design issues. Research that is 
particularly policy-relevant from a Spanish perspective is given special consideration. 
Disseminating research findings to a broader audience is also an aim of the program. The 
program enjoys the support from the IEB-Foundation and the IEB-UB Chair in Fiscal 
Federalism funded by Fundación ICO, Instituto de Estudios Fiscales and Institut d’Estudis 
Autonòmics. 
 
The Barcelona Institute of Economics (IEB) is a research centre at the University of 
Barcelona which specializes in the field of applied economics. Through the IEB-
Foundation, several private institutions (Caixa Catalunya, Abertis, La Caixa, Gas Natural 
and Applus) support several research programs. 
 
 
Postal Address: 
Institut d’Economia de Barcelona 
Facultat d’Economia i Empresa 
Universitat de Barcelona 
C/ Tinent Coronel Valenzuela, 1-11 
(08034) Barcelona, Spain 
Tel.: + 34 93 403 46 46 
Fax: + 34 93 403 98 32 
ieb@ub.edu 
http://www.ieb.ub.edu 
 
 
The IEB working papers represent ongoing research that is circulated to encourage 
discussion and has not undergone a peer review process. Any opinions expressed here are 
those of the author(s) and not those of IEB. 
 
 
 
Documents de Treball de l’IEB 2011/8 
IS THERE AN ELECTION CYCLE IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT?  
SEPARATING TIME EFFECTS FROM ELECTION YEAR EFFECTS* 
 
 
Matz Dahlberg, Eva Mörk 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT:  Do governments increase public employment in election years? This paper 
answers this question by using data from Sweden and Finland, two countries that are similar in 
many respects but in which local elections are held at different points in time. These facts make 
it possible for us to separate an election effect from other time effects. Our results indicate that 
there is a statistically significant election year effect in local public employment, a production 
factor that is highly visible in the welfare services provided by the local governments in the 
Scandinavian countries. The effect also seems to be economically significant; the 
municipalities employ 0.6 more full-time employees per 1,000 capita in election years than in 
other years (which correspond to an increase by approximately 1 percent). 
 
 
 
JEL Codes:  D72, H72, P16 
Keywords:  election cycle, public employment, exogenous elections 
 
 
 
Matz Dahlberg 
IBF and Department of Economics 
Uppsala University, IFAU, CESifo & IEB 
P.O. Box 513 
SE 751 20 Uppsala, Sweden 
E-mail: matz.dahlberg@nek.uu.se  
 
Eva Mörk 
Department of Economics 
Uppsala University, IFAU, CESifo, IZA & IEB 
P.O. Box 513 
SE 751 20 Uppsala, Sweden 
E-mail: eva.mork@nek.uu.se 
 
 
                                                 
* This paper has benefited from comments from Per Pettersson-Lidbom, Patrik Hesselius, Jon Fiva, Gissur 
Erlingsson, one anonymous referee and from seminar participants at IFN, IFAU, Ratio and at the 62th IIPF 
Congress in Paphos. We are also grateful to Per Pettersson-Lidbom for the idea to combine Swedish and 
Finnish data, to Heléne Lundqvist for excellent research assistance, and to Antti Moisio for supplying us with 
Finnish data and for answering our many questions on institutional matters for Finland. Remaining errors are 
of course ours. 
 1 Introduction 
Following the theoretical contributions of Nordhaus (1975), Lindbeck (1976), 
Rogoff and Sibert (1988), Rogoff (1990), Besley and Case (1995), Persson and 
Tabellini (2000), and Drazen and Eslava (2005), there is a large and growing 
empirical literature studying the effects of elections on public policy (see, e.g., 
Shi and Svensson, 2006, and Drazen and Eslava, 2010, for two recent studies 
and for references to earlier work). The present paper adds to the empirical 
political business cycle literature by investigating, on data from Finland and 
Sweden, whether there is an election cycle in local (municipal) employment.  
From an economic point of view, the paper adds to the literature by looking 
for election effects in municipal employment. This is a variable that is highly 
visible for the voters, especially in welfare states of the Nordic type where the 
local governments are responsible for welfare services that are highly labor 
intensive (such as schooling, child care, and care for the elderly and disabled). 
These services are also economically important in the sense that they constitute 
a large part of the local governments’ responsibilities. Visibility of a policy to 
the voters must be considered a minimum requirement if a politician wants to 
use a policy tactically (see also the theoretical discussion in Drazen and Eslava, 
2006, 2010).  
Employment as an outcome variable is also interesting more generally since 
it is, from a policy perspective, important that we know its determinants. 
Taking Sweden as an example, approximately 25 percent of all employed are 
employed by the municipalities.1 The implication is that to understand the 
determinants of overall employment, it is imperative that we understand the 
determinants of local government employment. From this perspective it is 
remarkably few studies that examine potential election effects in government 
employment.2 
On the methodological side we aim at improving on the earlier literature in 
two dimensions. By using data from two countries that are very similar in many 
                                                     
 
1 For a further discussion on this issue, see Section 2. 
2 The only study we know of is Coelho et al. (2006). For studies examining local government 
employment more generally, see Bergtsröm et al. (2004) and the references cited therein. 
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 respects, and that have fixed election dates but elections in different years, we 
are in a good position to both deal with the endogeneity issue and to be able to 
separately identify time effects from election year effects. 3 
Besides making it possible to separate between election effects and other 
time effects we argue that there are at least two advantages with using data 
from Sweden and Finland. First, when using cross-section data it is very hard 
to control for all factors that differ across very different countries and that 
might be correlated with both the election dummy and the public policy. The 
existing studies typically control for country-dummies but it is questionable 
whether these are enough to control for the very different settings the different 
countries work under. Second, the data in traditional cross-country studies is 
often of poor quality and there is often a lot of work with the data before esti-
mations.4 These problems do not occur with data from countries like Sweden 
and Finland. 
We find a significant election effect in local government employment rates; 
municipalities employ 0.6 more full-time employees per 1,000 capita in elec-
tion years than in other years. This corresponds to an increase by approxi-
mately 1 percent. Since several of the earlier studies have looked at election 
effects in total spending (see, e.g., Andrikopoulos et al., 2004, Blais and 
Nadeau, 1992, and Pettersson-Lidbom, 2003) and tax rates (see, e.g., 
Andrikopoulos et al., 2004, Kneebone and McKenzie, 2001, and Pettersson-
Lidbom, 2003), we thought it could be interesting to use our empirical 
approach also on these outcomes. We find a significant election effect also in 
                                                     
 
3 The nature of the endogeneity problem when estimating potential election effects is discussed 
in Shi and Svensson (2006). The best approach so far in the literature is the one adopted by 
Akhmedov and Zhuavskaya (2004) on Russian data. For most of the local elections in their data, 
the election dates are fixed. They do however not have a completely clean case since some of the 
election dates are chosen by the local politicians, implying that they still might have some 
unsolved endogeneity problems in their paper. A similar approach to solve the endogeneity 
problem was adopted by Shi and Svensson (2006) and Brender and Drazen (2004). They 
conducted separate estimations for countries where the elections were held within six months 
before or after the scheduled election date, which they argue can be considered as pre-
determined. 
4 Both Shi and Svensson (2006) and Brender and Drazen (2004) do for example use data from 
International Financial Statistics, published by the International Monetary Fund, which consists 
of fiscal data that are well known to be noisy (see the discussion in Brender and Drazen). 
Brender and Drazen do for example tamper with the data by filling in missing observations from 
other sources and by dropping or replacing outliers that they argue are unreliable data points. 
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 the local tax rate and in local total consumption. This is interesting since it 
contrasts with the results in Brender and Drazen (2004) and Shi and Svensson 
(2006) who do not get any election effects for their sub-samples of developed 
countries (in which Sweden and Finland are included).5  
2 Institutional background 
This paper builds on the assumption that Sweden and Finland are similar 
countries, at least when it comes to the role played by the local governments 
(municipalities). In this section we will therefore devote some time at describ-
ing, and comparing, the municipalities in the two countries. 
In both countries, the municipalities have strong, constitutionally regulated, 
independence, and are the key suppliers of welfare services, including primary 
and secondary education, day care, care for the elderly, care of the handicapped 
and the mentally ill, social assistance etc. In Finland, the municipalities are also 
responsible for health care and higher education, whereas the first is a respon-
sibility of the counties in Sweden (except for basic health care for elderly 
which is a municipal responsibility also in Sweden), and the second of the 
central government. Since the Finnish municipalities typically are too small to 
supply hospitals, neighboring municipalities cooperate in joint municipal au-
thorities. The municipalities in both countries are free to set their own tax rates 
and do not face any borrowing constraints. 
There are 290 municipalities in Sweden and 432 in Finland. The Finnish 
municipalities are typically somewhat smaller, both in population (see Table 1 
below for more details) and in geographical size. The inhabitants are unevenly 
spread in both countries, with the capitals Stockholm and Helsinki being the 
largest (with respect to population) and where the regions with lowest 
population densities are found in the northern part of the countries. 
The municipalities are lead by municipal councils elected every third or 
fourth year. During the studied period, six local elections have been held in 
Sweden (on the third Sunday in September 1985, 1988, 1991, 1994, 1998 and 
                                                     
 
5 Brender and Drazen (2004) and Shi and Svensson (2006) separate between new and mature 
democracies and find that the election cycle is present in new democracies only. 
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 2002) and four in Finland (on the fourth Sunday in October 1988, 1992, 1996, 
and 2000).  
The main source of municipal income comes from the local income tax 
(approximately 50–60 percent of municipal revenue).6 Intergovernmental 
grants from the central government make up approximately 15–20 percent of 
municipal income in both countries (this figure varies a lot between munici-
palities and some are more reliant on grants than others), and user fees make up 
approximately 5–10 percent. In 1993, major grant reforms took place in both 
Sweden and in Finland in which grants switched from being mainly targeted to 
becoming mainly general, thereby increasing the freedom of the 
municipalities.7 
During the early 1990s, both Sweden and Finland went into economic re-
cessions which of course affected the municipalities. As unemployment rose 
(see Figure 1), so did the costs for social assistance. Along with this, grants 
from the central governments decreased as the central governments were re-
constructing the public finances which meant that the municipalities had to rely 
on own-source revenues to a larger extent. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Average unemployment rate in Sweden and Finland, 1985–2002 
                                                     
 
6 In Finland the municipalities also raise property taxes whereas this is not the case in Sweden. 
7 For a thorough description of Finland and the Finnish grant reform, see Moisio (2002). For a 
description of the Swedish case, see, e.g., Bergström et al. (2004). 
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Source: Statistics Sweden and VATT 
3 Data 
We have data on all Swedish and Finnish municipalities for the period 1985–
2002. After excluding municipalities that have been engaged in mergers or 
splits during this period we end up with 276 Swedish municipalities and 411 
Finnish municipalities.8 Table 1 below presents summary statistics for the two 
countries. Besides municipal employment we also present summary statistics 
for a number of variables that will be used as covariates in the empirical 
analysis. These are municipal wages, municipal tax base, intergovernmental 
grants from the central government, municipal population, and the shares of the 
population aged 1–15 and older than 64 respectively.9 The reason for including 
these population shares is that many of the services supplied by the 
                                                     
 
8 We also follow earlier studies on Finnish data and exclude 16 Finnish municipalities on the 
island Åland. 
9 Employment is expressed as employees per 1,000 capita, wages in euros per month, and tax 
base and intergovernmental grants in Euros per capita. The exchange rate used for Finland was 1 
Euro = 5.94573 FIM for the period before the Euro was introduced in Finland, while the  
exchange rate for Sweden varied a bit over the period studied, from a minimum of 8.445858 SEK 
to a maximum of 9.35 SEK for 1 Euro. 
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 municipalities are targeted to people in those age-intervals (child care, 
schooling, and care for the elderly). 
The dependent variable that we will analyze is municipal employment10, 
which is somewhat higher in Sweden.11 Turning to the other variables, we see 
from the table that municipal wages as well as intergovernmental grants are 
somewhat higher in Finland than in Sweden, but that there are no large differ-
ences. 
Figure 2 shows how the average employment rate has evolved over time. It 
can be noted that average employment increased quite dramatically in Sweden 
between 1990 and 1991, as well as between 1991 and 1992. These increases 
coincide with the decentralization of schooling (1991) and elderly care (1992) 
to the municipal sector. In Finland, a drop can be noted in 1993. This was a 
result of the economic recession during the 1990s when many municipalities 
discharged their part-time labor force and laid off full-time employees in order 
to reduce their salary expenditures (see Moisio, 2002). We will discuss how to 
handle these jumps in the next section when presenting the econometric speci-
fication. 
 
                                                     
 
10 For Finland we include those that are employed by the joint authorities. An alternative way of 
defining municipal employment in Finland would be to only include those employed by the 
municipalities. However, since some of the joint authorities also provide all basic services such 
as education and social services, implying that some of the municipalities have zero employed 
persons, we argue that it is a better alternative to include than to exclude those that are employed 
by the joint authorities.  
11 One explanation for this might be that the Finnish data does not include part time employees 
whereas the Swedish data does. 
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 Table 1 Summary statistics, Mean, (st. dev.), [min.    max.], 1985–2002 
 Sweden Finland 
 
Municipal employment 
55.29 
(14.03) 
[19.67    101.3] 
48.22 
(16.23) 
[0.30    152.3] 
 
Wage, municipal 
employment 
1,202.7 
(295.6) 
[664.5    1,918] 
1,494.5 
(308.2) 
[774.3    2,484] 
 
Tax base 
7,063 
(2,158) 
[1,879    21,505] 
7,859 
(2,398) 
[2,752    31,713] 
 
Intergovernmental grants 
711.1 
(318.9) 
[-1,068    2,317] 
1,127 
(501.6) 
[-376.7    3,387] 
 
Population 
26,721 
(46,421) 
[3,629    754,948] 
11,159 
(31,848) 
[174    559,718] 
 
Share of population 1–15 
0.203 
(0.020) 
[0.127    0.292] 
0.208 
(0.033) 
[0.099    0.381] 
 
Share of population 65 + 
0.186 
(0.040) 
[0.051    0.297] 
0.166 
(0.044) 
[0.041    0.311] 
Number of municipalities 276 411 
Notes: Employment is expressed as employees per 1,000 capita, wages in euros per 
month, and tax base and intergovernmental grants in euros per capita.  
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 Figure 2 Average municipal employment in Sweden and Finland, 1985–2002 
 
Source: The Swedish Association of Local Authorities and VATT 
4 Econometric model 
When estimating the effects of elections on different policy variables one 
typically aims at estimating the following equation:  
 
 jttjjtjtjt fxELECTIONy ετθφ ++++= '   (1) 
 
where yjt is the policy variable of interested in country j, in year t, ELECTIONjt 
is a dummy variable taking on the value 1 if there is an election in country j in 
year t, zero otherwise, xjt are observable characteristics of the country, fj are 
unobserved, country-specific fixed effects, and τt are time-specific fixed 
effects. The major problem with estimating (1) using cross-country data is that 
the timing of the elections may be determined by other factors that are 
potentially affected by public policy, implying that the estimated election effect 
is quite likely to be biased. This is discussed in e.g. Shi and Svensson (2006). 
One solution to the endogeneity problem, that also have been used in empirical 
work analyzing election year effects, is to use data from one country in which 
the election dates are pre-determined by constitution (and hence strictly exoge-
nous). This could be done either by using a long time series on national elec-
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 tions12 or by using panel data on local government elections13. The problem 
with the first approach is that one gets rather few observations, which makes it 
hard to find statistically significant effects. The latter approach has a major 
advantage over national time series data in that it generates more observations 
on election periods. However, in most countries local elections are held on the 
same day across the country, implying that it is not possible to control for time-
specific fixed effects, i.e. τt in equation (1). Hence, it is hard to separately 
identify an election effect from other time effects. 
Our solution to this problem is to use data from two countries (Sweden and 
Finland) with fixed election dates, but in which local elections are held at 
different points in time. Thereby, the time effect in the country where no 
election is held can be used as a counterfactual to the time effect that would 
have been present in the country in which an election is held if there had not 
been an election. We will hence estimate the following baseline model: 
 
itcticitctcitc fxELECTIONy ετθφ ++++= '  (2) 
 
where yitc is the local public employment rate (i.e., the number of persons 
employed by the local public sector per thousand capita) in municipality i in 
country c, in year t, ELECTIONtc is a dummy variable taking on the value 1 if 
there is an election in country c in year t, zero otherwise, xict is observable char-
                                                     
 
12 The earliest empirical studies on election effects aimed at testing for electoral cycles in 
national output, unemployment and inflation using aggregate time series data. The general 
conclusion from these studies is that there is little empirical evidence of a political business cycle 
in inflation and unemployment (see, e.g., McCallum, 1978, Golden and Poterba, 1980, Beck, 
1987 and Alesina, 1989). 
13 This approach has e.g. been taken by Drazen and Eslava (2005), investigating Columbian local 
governments, Pettersson-Lidbom (2003), investigating Swedish municipalities, Galli and Rossi 
(2002), investigating Western German Länder, and Baleiras and da Silva Costa (2004), Coelho et 
al. (2006), and Veiga and Veiga (2007), investigating Portuguese local governments. 
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 acteristics of the municipalities14, fi are unobserved, municipality-specific fixed 
effects, and τt are time-specific fixed effects.15  
In order to examine how important it is to actually control for time effects 
we will however start by estimating the model in equation (1) for Sweden and 
Finland separately. In these estimations we are not able to control for time-
fixed effects. Also, we will estimate the model in equation (2) without time-
fixed effects.  
5 Results 
5.1 Estimating election year effects for Sweden and 
Finland separately 
We start by treating Finland and Sweden separately and estimate the model 
given by equation (1) for each country, but ignoring time-effects. The resulting 
election year effects are given in column (i) in Table 2. We find a positive and 
significant effect for Finland but not for Sweden. Earlier work following this 
method has however not ignored time-effects completely but tried different 
ways to take them into account. The most straightforward way would be to 
include linear time trends, and this is done in column (ii). However, the 
parameter estimates are not much affected by doing this. Looking at Figure 2, 
we note that there are some things going on in municipal employment in the 
two countries that will not be taken into account by linear time trends. 
                                                     
 
14 These are municipal tax base, intergovernmental grants, population, share of population aged 
1–15 and share of population older than 64. We allow share of population 1–15 and 65+ to have 
different effects in Sweden after the decentralization of schooling and care for elderly in 1991 
and 1992 respectively than before. 
15 Criticisms have been raised in the literature regarding difference-in-differences models 
estimating treatment effects for large groups that are treated at the same time; see, e.g., Bertrand 
et al. (2004). The fact that all individuals are treated at the same time makes it impossible to 
control for aggregate year-to-year shocks that affect all treated observations the same way. 
However, we argue that this type of criticism is less relevant in our set-up, since we have a case 
where the treatment (election) is repeatedly turned on and off, and its value yesterday says 
nothing about its value today. Hence, there exists no serial correlation in the treatment variable. 
In the Working Paper version of their paper, Bertrand et al. (2002) also present Monte Carlo 
evidence showing that when the serial correlation disappears, so does the over-rejection problem. 
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 Therefore, acknowledging the upward shift in municipal employment in 
Sweden 1991 (which depends on teachers becoming municipal employees) and 
the downward shift in Finland in 1993, we instead include two country-specific 
time-effects in the estimations; one for Sweden that takes the value 1 for the 
years 1991–2002 and zero otherwise, and one for Finland that takes the value 1 
for the years 1993–2002 and zero otherwise. These results, presented in column 
(iii), show that doing this we actually find negative election year effects both 
for Sweden and Finland, even thought the latter is statistically insignificant. 
Including the linear time trend in column (iv) does not change these findings. 
 
 
Table 2 Election effects on municipal employment: results for Sweden and 
Finland separately 
 i) ii) iii) iv) 
Sweden     
Election year -0.0627 -0.116 -0.282*** -0.356*** 
 (0.0763) (0.0763) (0.0882) (0.0827) 
Finland     
Election year 0.678*** 0.747*** -0.191 -0.0854 
 (0.135) (0.148) (0.142) (0.140) 
Trend No Yes No Yes 
Sweden_91/Finland_93 No No Yes Yes 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipal level within parentheses. *** denotes significance at 
the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level. The estimations control for 
intergovernmental grants, tax base, wage for municipal employees, population, share of population 0–15, 
share of population older than 64, as well as municipality specific fixed effects. In order to control for the 
decentralization of schooling (1991) and elderly care (1992) in Sweden, the parameters for share of 
population 0–15, share of population older than 64 are allowed to differ for Sweden after the decentralization. 
 
5.2 Estimating election year effects controlling for time 
effects 
As is clear from Table 2, we find rather puzzling and non-robust results when 
estimating election year effects for the two countries separately. We will now 
turn to our main analysis where we are able to separate election year effects 
from time effects. The results are given in Table 3. 
As a baseline, column (i) presents the same model as column (i) in Table 2, 
but where we pool data from Sweden and Finland and let the election year 
effect be the same for the two countries, but still not take time effects into 
12
 account. Doing this, we find a positive election year effect of 0.48. In column 
(ii) we instead estimate the model from equation (2) including time year 
effects. We find a positive and statistically significant election year effect; 
municipalities employ almost 2 more people per 1,000 capita in election years, 
which corresponds to an increase by approximately 4 percent (average 
municipal employment is 51 employees per 1,000 capita).  
The specification in equation (2) is then tested against some more flexible 
specifications. In column (iii) we include the two country-specific time-effects 
in the estimations; one for Sweden that takes the value 1 for the years 1991–
2002 and zero otherwise, and one for Finland that takes the value 1 for the 
years 1993–2002 and zero otherwise. Doing this we find that the size of the 
election year effect decreases to 1.6, but that it is still statistically significant.  
In column iv) we instead allow for different linear time trends in municipal 
employment in the two countries. It turns out that this does not alter our 
findings; the parameter estimates are almost identical in columns ii) and iv). 
The same is true if we include time trends in the model in column iii), see 
column (v).  
Finally, since the two countries do not supply exactly the same services, 
implying that the demographic structure and other observable covariates might 
affect employment differently in the two countries, we allow the parameter 
vector θ  to vary between the two countries. The result in column iv) shows 
that the estimated election effect decreases with 1 employee per 1,000 capita 
when allowing for country-specific parameters for the covariates. The effect is 
however still of economic as well as statistical significance; municipalities 
employ 0.6 more full-time employees per 1,000 capita in election years than in 
other years. This corresponds to an increase, on average, by approximately 1 
percent. Since an F-test rejects the null of equal parameter estimates for the two 
countries, we consider the model in column vi) as our preferred specification. 
 
Table 3 Baseline results 
 i) ii) iii) iv) v) vi) 
Election year 0.484*** 1.929*** 1.562*** 1.885*** 1.592*** 0.577** 
 (0.0878) (0.189) (0.259) (0.193) (0.259) (0.257) 
Other covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Munic. fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
13
 Sweden91/ Finland93 No No Yes No Yes Yes 
Country-specific trends No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Country-specific θ No No No No No Yes 
Number of obs. 12,284 12,284 12,284 12,284 12,284 12,284 
Number of munic. 687 687 687 687 687 687 
R-squared 0.59 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.66 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipal level within parentheses. *** denotes significance at 
the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level. Other observable covariates 
include intergovernmental grants, tax base, wage for municipal employees, population, share of population 
0–15, share of population older than 64. In order to control for the decentralization of schooling (1991) and 
elderly care (1992) in Sweden, the parameters for share of population 0–15, share of population older than 64 
are allowed to differ for Sweden after the decentralization. 
 
So far we have adjusted the standard errors for correlation over time for a 
single municipality. Since the elections to the central government are held on 
the same day as the municipal elections in Sweden, we may worry that there 
also exists a correlation in the standard errors over municipalities for each year 
(implying that we would need to cluster on year in the estimations in order to 
get unbiased estimates of the standard errors). A correlation in the standard 
errors over municipalities for each year would also be the case if the 
municipalities interact strategically with each other when taking decisions on 
their outcome variables, or if there are any other country-year specific shocks. 
In the working paper version of this paper (Dahlberg and Mörk, 2008) we 
investigate this more carefully by calculating the residuals from our preferred 
model specification and then plot them to check graphically if there seems to 
be any correlation over time and/or space. When doing this we observe a 
positive relationship over time; municipalities that had large residuals 
yesterday also seem to have large residuals today, but that it does not seem to 
be the case that the residual in one specific municipality is correlated with all 
other municipalities in the same country. Hence, our conclusion is that 
clustering the standard errors on cross-sectional unit will be enough to ensure 
that the standard errors are not underestimated. 
 
5.3 Alternative outcome-variables 
So far, we have focused on the number of employees in the municipal sector. 
The reason for this is that we believe that number of employees is highly 
visible for the voters and has a direct impact on the quality of the services pro-
vided by the municipalities. The earlier work cited in the introduction has typi-
cally not investigated the effects on municipal employment (the exception is 
14
 Coelho et al, 2006); instead, the earlier work has focused on total spending 
(see, e.g., Andrikopoulos et al., 2004, Blais and Nadeau, 1992, and Pettersson-
Lidbom, 2003), spending on different categories (see, e.g., Andrikopoulos et 
al., 2004, Blais and Nadeau, 1992, and Kneebone and McKenzie, 2001), tax 
rates (see, e.g., Andrikopoulos et al,. 2004, Kneebone and McKenzie, 2001, 
and Pettersson-Lidbom, 2003), and deficits (see, e.g., Brender and Drazen, 
2004, Galli and Rossi, 2002, and Shi and Svensson, 2006). These studies have 
typically found election cycles in those outcome-variables. It is therefore 
interesting to investigate whether we reach the same conclusion when 
separating time effects from election year effects.  
Table  gives the results for local tax rates and local total consumption.16 We 
find statistically significant election effects in both taxes and consumption. 
Starting with the local tax rates, we find an election effect of -0.05, i.e. tax rates 
are 0.05 percentage points smaller in election years than in other years. This 
corresponds to 0.25 percent lower taxes (the average tax rate is 18 percent). 
Looking at local consumption, the corresponding election effect is an increase 
with 68 euros per capita, which corresponds to 2.3 percent of the average value 
(average consumption is 2,900 euros per capita). 
 
 
Table 4 Results for local tax rates and local consumption 
 Local tax rate Local total 
consumption 
Election year effect -0.046*** 68.06*** 
 (2.67) (7.53) 
Other observable covariates Yes Yes 
Municipality fixed effects Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes 
                                                     
 
16 The tax rate and consumption variables are quite similar in the two countries in terms of 
descriptive statistics. While the local tax rate in Sweden has an average of 18.81 (with a standard 
deviation of 2.39), the corresponding figures for Finland are 17.66 (0.86). The corresponding 
figures for the consumption variable, which is only available for the years 1985–2001, is, for 
Sweden, 2,712 (704), and, for Finland 3,062 (833). All variables are expressed in Euros. It would 
be interesting to also investigate whether there are election year effects in deficits and different 
types of spending. However, we do not have data on these outcome measures for the Finnish 
municipalities. 
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 Sweden 91_02-dummy Yes Yes 
Finland 93_02-dummy Yes Yes 
Country-specific time trends Yes Yes 
Country-specific parameters for covariates Yes Yes 
Number of observations 12,284 12,001 
Number of municipalities 687 687 
R-squared 0.92 0.91 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered on cross-sectional units within parentheses. *** denotes significance 
at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level. Local total consumption is only 
available for the period 1995–2001. Other observable covariates include intergovernmental grants, tax base, 
wage for municipal employees, population, share of population 0–15, share of population older than 64. In 
order to control for the decentralization of schooling (1991) and elderly care (1992) in Sweden, the 
parameters for share of population 0–15, share of population older than 64 are allowed to differ for Sweden 
after the decentralization. Also, the definition of consumption changes slightly between 1995 and 1996 in 
Sweden. The model for local consumption therefore also include a Sweden specific dummy, taking the value 
1 for years 1996–2001 in Sweden, and zero otherwise. 
6 Conclusions 
In this paper, we have examined whether local governments increase public 
employment in election years. By using data from Sweden and Finland, two 
countries that are similar in many respects when it comes to municipal decision 
making but in which local elections are held at different points in time, we can 
separately identify an election year effect from other time effects.  
Our results indicate that there is an election year effect in local public em-
ployment; municipalities employ 0.6 more full-time employees per 1,000 
capita in election years than in other years. This corresponds to an increase by 
approximately 1 percent. The results also show that there are election year 
effects in both local tax rates and local consumption; tax rates are 0.25 percent 
lower and consumption is 2.3 percent higher in election years. Our results thus 
contrasts with the results in Brender and Drazen (2004) and Shi and Svensson 
(2006) who do not get any election effects for their sub-samples of developed 
countries (in which Sweden and Finland are included). The results are however 
in line with Pettersson-Lidbom (2003) who finds election year effects corre-
sponding to a 0.6 percent decrease in tax rates and a 3 percent increase in 
spending. 
The next question to ask is why there exists an election year effect. Having 
the literature on political business cycles in mind, we argue that the most likely 
explanation is that local governments increase employment in election years in 
order to increase their vote share and hence their re-election probability. By in-
creasing the number of persons employed by the local government the local 
16
 government accomplishes two things, where both are likely to be valued by the 
voters. First, since the services provided by local governments are labor inten-
sive, the quality of the provided services increases. The amount of personnel at 
child care centers, schools and elderly care centers are highly visible among the 
users and most local voters are users of local services. Second, unemployment 
in the municipality will quite likely fall. Even though labor market policy is the 
responsibility of the central government, local governments have taken an in-
creasing active part in tackling unemployment, and it is likely that voters are 
not perfectly aware of where the local responsibilities end and where the 
central responsibilities begin. Hence, there is a possibility that local politicians 
are rewarded for low local unemployment rates.  
Given that voters might be unaware of the exact division of responsibilities 
between the central and the local government, one potential alternative expla-
nation is that it’s in fact the central government that is behind the increase in 
municipal employment. This is perhaps most likely for Sweden where local and 
central elections are held the same day. How would a central government go 
about if it wants to increase municipal employment? The best instrument that 
the central government has at its disposal is the use of intergovernmental 
grants. By conditioning grants on increases in municipal employment it is pos-
sible for the central government to affect the number of employees in the 
municipalities. In Sweden there have actually been several examples where the 
central government has tried to increase the personnel-density in municipal 
services. However, given that we in our estimations control for intergovern-
mental grants, these kinds of actions would not result in an election year effect. 
If some of the central government grants aimed at increasing local public em-
ployment in election years are not part of the intergovernmental grants that we 
control for in the econometric specification, this will be picked up by the 
election dummy. The interpretation is then that we have an election year effect, 
but that we cannot be sure whether it has been instigated by the local or by the 
central government. We do however think that there are few such grants that 
we do not control for. There are of course other, more direct ways, in which the 
central government may try to influence local governmental behavior (e.g. laws 
and prescriptions). We are however not aware of any such matters occurring. 
We are therefore inclined to believe that the election year effect we have found 
in this paper is a result of local governmental rather than central governmental 
behavior. 
The next interesting question to investigate is whether increases in the 
number of municipal employees actually increase the vote share of the incum-
17
 bent government. Although this is a highly relevant issue to investigate, it is 
not a trivial issue, since there are many other things that also affect individuals’ 
voting decisions. We hope that future research will manage to find a way to 
answer this question in a credible way. 
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 Appendix 
 
Table A.1. Baseline results: Municipal Employment 
 i) ii) iii) iv) 
Election year 1.929*** 1.562*** 1.592*** 0.577*** 
 (10.69) (7.38) (7.33) (2.74) 
Grants 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.013*** 
 (12.95) (12.40) (11.18) (14.56) 
Tax base 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000 
 (3.12) (3.79) (3.77) (0.91) 
Wage -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.015*** 
 (8.97) (8.43) (8.44) (5.39) 
Population -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (7.42) (7.25) (7.26) (8.97) 
Share 0–15 -21.217** -18.570** -18.243* -2.074 
 (2.29) (1.99) (1.95) (0.18) 
Share 65+ -51.826*** -50.401*** -49.181*** -1.693 
 (6.97) (6.77) (6.40) (0.14) 
Share 0–15 *Sweden 
91–02 
57.052*** -2.666 -1.351 -4.671 
 (27.01) (0.25) (0.13) (0.47) 
Share 65+ * 
Sweden 92–02 
76.039*** 64.675*** 64.997*** 38.636*** 
 (35.90) (19.91) (19.71) (10.65) 
Grants * Finland    -0.008*** 
    (8.67) 
Wage * Finland    -0.012*** 
    (3.10) 
Tax base * Finland    0.001*** 
    (3.87) 
Population * Finland    0.001*** 
    (8.35) 
Share 0–15 * Finland    -8.560 
    (0.53) 
Share 65+ * Finland    -41.695*** 
    (2.82) 
Sweden 91–02  13.281*** 12.805*** 12.405*** 
  (5.74) (5.43) (5.61) 
Finland 93–02  -1.152** -0.812 -6.414*** 
  (2.34) (1.30) (8.90) 
Trend Sweden   1.676*** 1.581*** 
   (10.20) (11.59) 
Trend Finland   1.628*** 1.876*** 
   (10.00) (8.66) 
Constant 75.131*** 73.617*** 71.819*** 62.814*** 
 (21.44) (20.39) (20.48) (18.85) 
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  i) ii) iii) iv) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of observations 12,284 12,284 12,284 12,284 
No of municipalities 687 687 687 687 
R-squared 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.66 
Notes: Robust standard errors within parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1 
percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level. 
 
 
Table A.2. Results: Other outcomes  
 Local tax rate Local total consumption 
Election year -0.046*** 90.689*** 
 (2.67) (9.98) 
Grants -0.001*** 0.653*** 
 (5.71) (10.07) 
Tax base -0.000** 0.082*** 
 (2.19) (6.84) 
Wage -0.003*** 0.052 
 (9.62) (0.38) 
Population 0.000 -0.015*** 
 (0.57) (3.23) 
Share 0–15 -4.000 -1,055.772 
 (1.54) (1.03) 
Share 65+ 0.678 746.441 
 (0.29) (0.71) 
Share 0–15 * Sweden 91–02 10.335*** 2,224.240*** 
 (6.68) (3.60) 
Share 65+ * Sweden 92–02 10.511*** 2,222.581*** 
 (26.47) (13.19) 
Grants * Finland 0.001*** 0.021 
 (7.25) (0.31) 
Wage * Finland 0.004*** -0.040 
 (10.27) (0.27) 
Tax base * Finland 0.000 -0.012 
 (1.52) (0.70) 
Population * Finland 0.000** 0.009 
 (2.45) (1.54) 
Share 0–15 * Finland 2.623 1,532.816 
 (0.92) (1.23) 
Share 65+ * Finland -2.918 2,521.152** 
 (1.10) (1.99) 
Sweden 91–02 -1.812*** -561.213*** 
 (5.72) (4.42) 
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  Local tax rate Local total consumption 
Finland 93–02 0.132 -33.815 
 (1.61) (0.85) 
Sweden 95–02  -610.877*** 
  (24.06) 
Trend Sweden 0.397*** 95.306*** 
 (26.16) (15.09) 
Trend Finland 0.053*** 85.566*** 
 (5.07) (15.65) 
Constant 17.744*** 755.233*** 
 (43.54) (3.88) 
Year effects Yes Yes 
No of observations 12,284 12,001 
No of municipalities 687 687 
R-squared 0.92 0.92 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered on cross-sectional units within parentheses. 
*** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 
percent level. 
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